عنوان مقاله [English]
This study aimed at investigating the effect of CEO power on the value of the company with the interactive role of market competition in companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange and was during 2011-2017. Based on the systematic elimination method, 145 companies were selected as the statistical sample. In order to analyze the data, variance heterogeneity pre-test, F Limer test, Hausman test and Jarque-Bera test and then multivariate regression test were used to confirm and reject the research hypotheses. The results showed that when the competition in the product market is high, the power of the CEO has a positive relationship with the value of the company; in addition, when the competition in the product market is high and the corporate governance is strong, the power of the CEO is positively related to the value of the company. The results obtained in this study are consistent with the documentation referenced in the research theoretical framework and financial literature. Consequently, when markets are competitive, executive capacity increases, and executives communicate with rapid decisions and responses to changes in market conditions. Also, strong corporate governance leads to effective oversight of managers and leads managers to push their strategic decisions to value the company.
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